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MEANING'S EDGE, LOVE'S PRIORITY
Patrick McKinley Brennan*
THE EDGE OF MEANING. By James Boyd White. Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press. 2001. Pp. xiv, 301. Cloth, $25; paper,

$17.

The god did not exist; but all the cosmic and psychic forces, the attrac
tions, the passions which took shape in him, the idea which the artist and
his contemporaries conceived of him - all that was present in the statue,
not in a physical sense but in alio esse, in another mode of existence, and
after the manner of the presence of knowability. For the statue had been
made precisely to make all that known, to communicate it. In our muse
ums, this pagan content is asleep, but it is always there. Let some acci
dent take place, an encounter with a soul itself sensitized by some uncon
scious content: contact is established; the pagan content will be
awakened and will unforgettably wound that soul.
- Jacques Maritain'
I.

CONSTITUTION AND FAITH

The story is told of an American wending his way through the
British Museum. Reaching the R0osetta Stone, he reached right over
the railing, touched the scarred slab, and lamented: "It doesn't feel
meaningful." Whereupon an old Briton was heard to mumble: "The
poor American's got this old thing confused with the B larney Stone."
A bully presses his case, but meaning is much more modest.
Powerless to insist upon itself, meaning lies in wait of discovery. What
distinguishes the Rosetta Stone from other rocks of the same kind and

* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, The College of Law at Arizona State University.
B.A. 1988, Yale; J.D. 1993, University of California at Berkeley (Boal! Hall); M.A. 1999,
University of Toronto. - Ed. Jack Coons and Steve Smith provided critical comments on a
draft of this Review, for the acuity and generosity of which I am exceedingly grateful. Grati
tude of another sort prompts me to dedicate this Review, first, to Michael Bossone, Tiffany
Hamilton, Leslie Mamaghani, and Tammy Vavra, members of the ASU administration or
staff whose competence and cheer make it possible for my writing and teaching to go for
ward despite the administrative burden we share; and, second, to Michael Berch, Jon Rose,
and Owen Jones, colleagues at ASU whose friendship and exemplary professionalism make
a pleasure of what would otherwise be the impossible. Additional thanks go to Trish White,
than whom a more supportive Dean cannot, I would wager, be located. The last of these first
words concerns my fiancee, Jaime Daddona, who daily shows me the lived meaning of love's
priority.

1. Jacques Maritain, Language and the Theory of Sign, in FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS 51,
53 (John N. Deely et al. eds., 1986).
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size is that it was someone's - or rather a group's - act of meaning.
But those who come later cannot count on the Stone to make that
meaning known. Meaning, if it is to be found or made, first has to be
desired. This desire and the method of its satisfaction are James Boyd
White's2 concern in The Edge of Meaning. And what is at issue, if
White be correct, is human life itself:

I think that this is as deep a need as a human being has: a need of the
mind or soul, the need for what we call meaning in life. When it becomes
clear that there is no way of meeting it, a person may die, either by sim
ply withering away or by suicide. (p. 7)
Sometimes White is said to be among those pursuing interdiscipli
nary studies in law. And to be sure, in this book as in White's earlier
writings, one finds learning and insight that are of interest to lawyer,
classicist, literary critic, philosopher, and theologian alike. B ut against
the background of what is going forward (or backward) in the name of
interdisciplinarity,3 to lump White in with the "interdisciplinarians" is
to miss the point. The typical interdisciplinary claim is that law,
hitherto (seemingly) autonomous, needs to be supplemented by, or
understood with the help of, something outside or beyond itself, such
as economics, queer theory, moral philosophy, or the like.4 Indeed at
one time White himself flirted with understanding his work as con
tributing " toward the definition of a new subject, with a new method,
linking the fields of law and literature and perhaps classics and
anthropology as well."5 B ut White resisted this categorization because
the world opened to him by reading texts as he does is a world he
"see[s] as one."6 In The Edge of Meaning, as in his earlier books,
White cuts across the borders that artificially divide disciplines and
their methods, by cutting below to the very method by which humans
create and discover meaning, across the breadth of human living, law
included.

The Edge of Meaning is

an idea brilliantly conceived, magisterially

realized. Its pedagogy is the one White has perfected over the last
third of a century, viz., a self-conscious and theoretically original, but
fluid and fluent movement among all kinds of acts of meaning, all of it

2. L.Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, Professor of English, Adjunct Professor
of Classical Studies, University of Michigan.
3. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: lnterdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1217
(2002).
4. See Richard A Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV.L. REV.761 (1987).

5. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY xiii (1985) [hereinafter
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING].
6. See id.
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with an eye to the deepest human sources and springs of meaning.7 In
this graceful study, we encounter with White texts of Plato, Thoreau,
Twain, Homer, Frost, and Herbert, as well as paintings of Vermeer
and Rembrandt. In addition, interspersed among these encounters are
a chapter on how one learns to read a foreign language (here, ancient
Greek), another on how what we call the "sentence" structures our
experience, and finally one on the place of composition in law's mak
ing. These are all principally occasions for learning by doing, in
response to the bidding of a challenging guide.
White is not about getting some "information" across (we are too
used to reducing life's moments to FYI points), he is not willing to
attempt to bore us into submission.8 Rather, he hopes - the book is
full of hope - to improve us. The hope need not be in vain. Readers
who choose to travel with White through The Edge of Meaning will be
a little transformed: into persons who better understand how they
desire meaning and make it together in their common but imperfect
languages. I use the word 'transformed' advisedly. While it risks
portending a Great Awakening that cannot occur, it telegraphs that
for White, what he shares with us would contribute to who we shall be.
The meaning we make and discover is, in the idiom White has made
familiar,

constitutive

of who we are, both as individuals and as

community.9 Yes, meanings have a communicative function, but they
inevitably also exercise a constitutive function.

[E]ach moment is the opportunity for a new sentence, remaking one's
language and culture, remaking one's relations with others, redefining
one's own mind and character. This is the essence of moral life; its ir
reducibility to rules or principles of imitation.This is a point at which we
engage in creation. (pp.128-29)
So much for speed reading.
Given that White hopes to affect and alter us, we should wish to
make up our minds about who this James Boyd White - who the
publisher informs us is Hart Wright Professor of Law, professor of
English, and adjunct professor of classical studies in the University of
Michigan - really is. Reaching a judgment about White's character is

7. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN
LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS (1994); JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECJ'ATION TO
EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION (1999) [hereinafter WHITE, FROM
EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990) [hereinafter
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION:
STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973); WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 5.
8. On boring one's audience into submission, see Paul F. Campos, A Heterodox Cate
chism, in AGAINST THE LAW 7, 11 (Paul F.Campos et al. eds., 1996).

9. See, e.g., WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at xiv, 101-02; WHITE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 5, at 266-67.
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not extracurricular, an ad hominem frolic and detour. Yes, this is a
book review; but the book is a person's speech, and what we should
make of someone's speech turns in part on the character of the
speaker whose act of meaning it is. The mendacious may mouth the
same sounds as those of which the sincere also are capable, but the
meanings beyond the sounds are toto caelo apart; and it is we, not the
mendacious, who become silly if we do not bother to ask whether it is
mendacity or sincerity we face.
Ponder then, in this light, what White reveals of his own self as he
plumbs the poetry of the seventeenth-century Anglican divine George
Herbert:

I think the question at the center of [all Herbert's poetry] is not whether
his Lord is a God of love, but whether he can imagine that he himself,
with all his faults of mind and character, is loved. As readers of the book
we know of course that he can, for at least in my experience it is not pos
sible to read through this sincere and intelligent and scathingly honest
verse of self-searching without in s9me sense feeling love for the person
who speaks to us in such a courageous and open way.(p.216)
In this passage White manifests in a moment the self one feels one
comes to know from the heights and depths he reaches not only
throughout The Edge of Meaning but in all his many writings - a
person who himself is sincere, intelligent, honest, courageous, open.
Throughout The Edge of Meaning, White again gently but arrestingly
distinguishes himself as one of this generation's great teachers - not
just about how to think about Greek philosophy, American poetry, or
the j udicial opinion, but about how to think about all these and so
many other subjects and disciplines, because of what he teaches us
about how we stand, or should stand, in relation to one another. From
White we learn that meaning is as fragile as it is important, and that
even what we should value most is always "subject to threat" (p. 281 ),
including the threat that is our own indifference or unwillingness.
White shows us how it is up to us to constitute ourselves as more than
brute beasts, by creating meaning and valuing the valuable. If I have a
worry about where White stands, it concerns whether in his well
placed insistence on meaning he has slighted value - I return to this
concern below.
The notion that we are being constituted through sharing meaning
is strong medicine for those who fancy themselves nicely constituted
as they already stand (or slouch), but there is still more medicine.
What White says about faith in other areas of human inquiry, he
would apply to law exemplarily:

In looking at paintings for their meaning, as in reading poems, we focus
upon details, then shift to structure, then return to details, then shift our
perspective, asking other questions, then return to where we began, and
so forth, in an endless process. It is a search for meaning; it rests upon a
faith that the picture, or the text, will yield meaning, in the form of its
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various meanings and beyond them too. It is the same faith, I believe,
with which the biologist studies the cell, the astronomer the stars; a faith
that the universe has meaning and that we can apprehend it, seeing what
is really there; even more, that as parts of the universe, parts of the crea
tion, we too are bearers of meaning.(p.287; emphasis added)
White turns out, then, to be a case in point in Steven Smith's porten
tous observation that "it may now be possible, for the first time in a
long time, to consider the possibility of a j urisprudence that under
stands law as an expression of faith."10

11.

METHOD AND MEANING

Facing up to the place of faith in law is risky business, for, as Smith
observes, " [i]n modern academic discourse, 'faith' is sometimes under
stood not in terms of what it is, but rather in terms of what it suppos
edly is not
that is, 'reason.' So 'faith' becomes almost by definition a
form of irrational, or at best, nonrational belief."11 B ut a great virtue
of White's work is that it shows us that what we do in law, at least
when we do it well, makes sense, even if it turns out that the center
-

holds through acts of (what we refer to as) faith, rather than through,
say, the feats of Ronald Dworkin's Hercules . 1 2 I shall return below to
faith's place in law. I mention Hercules here in order to call attention
to the fact that we are used to the idea (even if we sometimes resist it)
that we can understand what we do in law by thinking about how
someone superhuman would do the job. B ut John Noonan was surely
right to observe, "It is strange to talk of Hercules when your starting
point is Harry Blackmun."13 Quite simply, Dworkin's superhuman
"judge of method"1 4 is a distraction from the hard facts about the
human methods by which we can, if we would choose, order our living
so as to create meaning and instantiate value. Acceding to this plea for
a human touchstone in legal thinking, we might then hasten to agree
with Steven Winter that "law is no different than any other product of
human cognition."15 But have we bothered to get to know our own
cognitive ways and means? Alas, Joseph Vining remains right: "We
hardly know ourselves."16 Happily for us, White (like Vining himself)
is an exception to the usual lawyerly lack of self-awareness, and he has
written this new book in aid of our satisfying the imperative given at
10. Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (1999).
1 1. Id. at 1098.
12. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
13. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 174 (1976).
14. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 240.
15. Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cogni
tive Stake for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1989).
16. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 344 ( 1995).
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Delphi. Reading White, we get to know White; we also get to know
ourselves, and, in particular, something of the method by which we
avoid madness.
In j urisprudential circles today, method has something of a bad
reputation, associated as it is with the "legal process" movement that
failed even on its own terms.17 But White must be credited with the
insights that it is through a cognitive method, rather than through the
shortcut of an epiphanic moment of cognitive magic or mystery, that
we humans create and discover meaning; and that that method is the
very way of being of the properly human self. White, I should note,
prefers the word process to refer to what I shall call a method; but, for
reasons to which I shall come, I think that what White has in mind is
more reliably signaled by the word method, and that conceiving of
what is at issue more clearly as method helps avoid strains on White's
thinking. White begins to call attention to this method/process as he
offers his reasons for the diversity of works he explores:

One of the points of this diversity is to make it easier for us to see, and
begin to analyze, the process at work in all of them; another is to begin to
show how different people, located in different cultural contexts and
working in different genres, address in significantly different ways the
possibilities and difficulties inherent in the process in which we are all
engaged. (p. xi)
White then offers the following phenomenology of that method/
process:

I think that in each of us there is a part of our being that is the source of
mental life and imagination; that, without our being wholly aware of it, in
this part of the self we are constantly asking a set of questions about the
world, of which the deepest is the question of meaning as I have defined it
above, namely, whether we can find or make an adequate way of imag
ining the world, and the self and others within it; that to ask this question
is to involve us in trying to respond to it, which in turn brings us to face
the adequacies and inadequacies of the languages we are given to speak,
of the cultures we inhabit, and the constraints imposed on us by nature as
well; that our engagement with these questions is for the most part un
conscious, but can be made the object of attention and thought, particu
larly through the careful reading and study of certain works of literature
and other forms of art, including the art of law; indeed that to ni.ake us
aware of this process and our own participation in it, and to teach us how
to think about and criticize our own performances of it, is one of.the cen
tral functions of art; and, finally, that we pursue these questions not alone
but in relation to others, with whom we make real whatever we manage
to learn. The process to which I am drawing attention is thus one in
which we all engage, all the time, but do so for the most part outside the

17. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW cxiii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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field of conscious awareness - it is a piece of that rich and complex life
that takes place in the ocean of the mind, beneath the surface on which
we consciously live. But it does manifest itself constantly in what we say
and do; not explicitly, but in our performances with language and each
other.(pp.xi-xii; emphasis added)
White's own book is an offering of a piece of art that has among its
purposes the knowing of the self: "At the place or moment to which
art can in this way lead us, we naturally find ourselves asking questions
of many kinds, about the world, about language, and about the self"
(p. 4). White continues:

The deepest question, I think, the one at the center of it all, unites all
three topics: it is whether we can find, or make, a way of imagining the
self and the world and others within it that will fit with our experience enable us to have experience - in such a way as to make possible coher
ent and valuable forms of speech and thought and action.The major aim
of this book will be to focus attention on this question, showing how cer
tain writers have addressed it and made it available to us, and in this way
to make it the object of thought. (p. 4)

The Edge of Meaning, then, is animated by a " deepest ques
tion,"(p. 4; internal quotation marks omitted) and concerns the "part
of the self" (p. xii) in (or by) which "we are constantly asking a set of
questions" (p. xii). White thus contributes a desperately needed
corrective to the underappreciation of the place of the question in
human living. The operative assumption, subject to the rare exception,
is that the asking of questions is epiphenomena! to human knowing,
the latter occurring (if at all) by the mind's eye's taking a sort of
mental look. The usual, if unarticulated, thinking is that knowing
occurs by the mind's getting its version of 20/20 vision - "the view
from nowhere," with nothing allowed to obnubilate the mental looks.
B ut notice this stark fact: the mind that asks no questions, reaches no
answers. In other words, gaping at the Rosetta Stone gets you
nowhere. Without asking, "What does this mean?" or "What should I
do?," I shall not know. Period. B ut I do ask such questions, all the
time, as do you. (Do you not?) We ask these questions because we
desire to know. In calling attention to the foundational position of our
questioning, White stands in the tradition of Aristotle, who began his
with a wondrous observation: "All men by nature desire
to know."18 As one contemporary commentator explains, "This radical
dynamism, both longing and capacity, without which we would never
be drawn to know anything, is inborn within us, defining our nature as

Metaphysics

1 8. 1 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 114 (W.0. Ross ed., 1924); see also 2 ARISTOTLE,
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 1 75 (Hugh Tredennick ed. & trans., 1960) ("There are four kinds of
question that we ask, and they correspond to the kinds of things that we know. They are: the
question of fact, the question of reason or cause, the question of existence, and the question
of essence . . . . These are the four kinds of question which we ask and the four kinds of
knowledge which we have when we have discovered the answers. ").
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human and not merely animal."19 And another twentieth-century
philosopher, B ernard Lonergan, refines the point as he develops the
implications of Aristotle's locating erotic desire at the root of our
human knowing: "[Our] primordial drive [to understand] is the pure
question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words, for
insights, concepts, words, have to do with answers; and before we look
for answers, we want them; such wanting is the pure question. "20
We want to be knowers, even know-it-alls. To be sure, we can be
lazy, and often we are even proud. So, at times we attend more to
answers previously amassed than to the normative significance of our
insatiable asking of the fresh questions in our quest for new answers.
Eager to take a rest, we codify our answers, transmuting questions'
answers into collections of propositions. There is wisdom in organizing
and perhaps appropriating what we have received (a point to which I
shall return below), but there is sloth in pointing to the encyclopedia
or the Restatement (Seventh) of Everything. A mischievous Yale
Divinity student was on the trail of this anaesthesia of intelligence
when he tacked to his door an advertisement for Thomas Aquinas's
Summa Theologiae that included this vaunt: "Contains the sum-total
of philosophical and theological wisdom." The advertising was false in
at least the following two respects. The first is obvious: there is
more to be learnt. The second proves harder to live with: wisdom or
knowledge, when it exists, is in the mind, not in the black marks on the
printed page.
I do not mean that the black marks necessarily mean nothing
whatever. The claim, rather, is an instance of the more general point
that while the truth is independent of us, even the truth is not so objec
tive as to be able to get by without the mind of the human subject.21
Some readers of the Summa are dull and blunt, others insightful and
acute. What the reader brings as tools for understanding makes a
critical difference. The mind and meaning of Aquinas fare better i n
t h e mind o f a John o f Saint Thomas than in t h e mind o f a dullard. As
philosopher Joseph Flanagan explains, "It is not language that
explains knowing, but knowing that explains language . . . . [M]eanings,
while carried in words, depend primarily not on the words themselves,
but on the prior acts of knowing that explain and ground the acts of
meaning."22 And as knowing, it is, as I have been suggesting, neither
more nor less than asking questions and answering them. "Knowing

19. W. NORRIS CLARKE, THE ONE AND THE MANY 14 (2001).
20. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 9 (3d
ed. 1970) [hereinafter LONERGAN, INSIGHT].
21. BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, Introduction to A SECOND COLLECTION (1974) (fifth
page of unpaginated introduction).
22,. JOSEPH FLANAGAN, QUEST FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LONERGAN'S
PHILOSOPHY 1 82 (1997).
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consists in answering questions. Meaningless questions and meaning
less answers are neither questions nor answers. If our knowledge is
constituted by answering questions, our knowledge is constituted by
meaning. " 23 It is meaning all the way down, or it's gibberish. (The
meaning concerns something real or imagined; but that something real
or imagined can be, but is not necessarily, itself meaning).
To be sure, all this will seem very paradoxical to the common
strain of thought that identifies our knowing with something like
perception or sensation, and, on that basis, accords the greatest (or
only) reality to what we can see or touch. But knowing does not come
to pass thanks only to seeing or touching. If all you do is gape or
touch, your experience will be meaningless, as the poor American
disappointed by the Rosetta Stone half realized. Meaning has no
spatial location, but without it we wither. And it is thus that it is a
mark of the passage from childish ways to adulthood to discover that
there is no consolation in the puerile wish: "Sticks and stones will
break my bones, but names will never hurt me." A life free from sticks
and stones but lacking meaning, is hardly a human life. It is only slight
overstatement to say, " [h]uman living really is a struggle for meaning,
an effort, because meaning is constituent of human living. The effort
to live is fundamentally the struggle for meaning."24 And law, of
course, when there is any, is not sticks and stones (though it may both
use these and try to prevent their use), but (in part) meaning, of a
certain sort. As Lonergan observes:

[I] f you want to do a study of law courts and go in with a machine that
will measure the decibels of the sounds made by the different speakers or
the arrangement of people in the room on different sides and places, and
so on, you will not understand anything about the law court."25
What you will have missed is the meaning of it all. But if law is consti
tuted (in part) by meaning, of a certain sort, then law is the product of
asking and answering certain questions, in a certain way.
It is a demerit of much of work in law that it blunders forward
without ever getting clear on how we know what it is we claim, in law,
to know. Professor Glendon may be right that many of our best legal
minds are so busy doing law well that they do not stop to describe

23. 6 BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS 1958-1 964, at 183,
198-99 (Robert C. Croken et al. eds., 1 996) (hereinafter LONERGAN, The Analogy of Mean
ing].

24. 6 BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, Time and Meaning, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 94,
106.
25. LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, supra note 23, at 204. For a marvelous decon
struction of an attempt to treat knowing law as simple "seeing, " see PAUL KAHN, THE
REIGN OF LAW 222-29 (1997).
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their method;26 but Professor Posner is also right that we are much too
used to cottoning to propositions, even "neutral principles," in light of
their appearing under the West or Foundation imprimatur, 'their
having been authored by Professor Sterling of the Elite Law School.27
Thanks to Legal Realism's airing the possibility that Sterling is in
reality a Gilding, questions of legal j ustification are getting raised all
the time. Frequently and familiarly, they are answered with a more or
less thoroughgoing skepticism (itself lacking epistemic warrant, of
course) - whereupon law is shown the exit as "policy science" is
ushered in on a sedan chair. The ensuing response assumes any
number of forms, all of which would work a reconstructive miracle
courtesy of various epistemic wonders, the range of which has been
catalogued and deconstructed by Pierre Schlag.28 The result, as Steven
Smith has shown splendidly, is that much of what we say in law seems,
upon sober reflection, to be nonsense29 - so we avoid sobriety.
B ut in White's work, there is no nonsense, but instead an honest
appropriation of what we are doing when we are making and discov
ering meaning, including meaning that amounts to law. White cuts
through all the nonsense by going to the root of both problem and so
lution. As White shows time and again - from the meaning of a
Greek sentence to the meaning of a statute - the criteria for giving
(or withholding) assent or consent are given on the side of the human
subject. Nothing is evident, let alone self-evident, except to a mind
that has satisfied, as to the issue in question, its desire to know. When
propositions are not self-authenticating, when starting points are not
self-moving marionettes, when reality isn't forcing itself upon us (and
it never forces itself upon the mind, we can always deceive ourselves)
- then, we are remitted to the process of asking and answering ques
tions, answers being achieved only by the subject's satisfying the desire
to know. "It is," White says, "a matter of having questions, and
pursuing them as far as one can" (p. 101).
If this insistence, that knowing is through question-and-answer,
still seems otiose (distinctions without real difference), notice that the
spectacular success of modern science is the result of the working out
of the logic of question-and-answer. The scientist does not simply see
or otherwise sense. Science is generated by the asking and answering
of questions. The scientist questions his experience (What does this
mean?), interprets those experiences, makes a formulation of that
understanding of experience, and then reaches a judgment about

26. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 231 (1994).
27. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 70-71 (1995).
28. See Pierre J. Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1627 (1991 ); see
also PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
29. STEVEN D.SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
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whether the data that are his experience support that understanding
(Is this really so? How probable is this?). The questions one asks

control what one can come to know; the person who does no more
than experience or imagine will know nothing. Nor, moreover, will we
know very much unless we allow our knowing to build on what others
have already known. One cannot say this without the obligatory
quoting of Newton: "If I have been able to see farther than others, it
was because I stood on the shoulders of giants."30 What allowed
modern science to take off as it did was its becoming a methodical
asking and answering of questions. "Method," as Lonergan explains,
"is not a set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt,"31 turning
out recipe-like the same result every time. Method is not a set of rules
at all. Method is, rather, "a normative pattern of recurrent and related
operations yielding progressive and cumulative results."32 When the
asking and answering of a specific type of question occurs not episodi
cally but repeatedly and in light of past answers to the same type of
question, progressive and cumulative results become possible and then
actual. "The wheel of method not only turns but also rolls along."33
But none of this happens as it should unless we choose to allow it to
happen; instead of choosing to be methodical we can drift or gawk.
Which is why I prefer the label 'method' to White's 'process.' Process
in modern parlance tends to denote what happens automatically;
'method', to my mind at least, signals the need to choose to be
methodical if knowledge is to enter and grow.
So spectacular has been the success of modern science, that, alas, it
has filled the common mind with the common nonsense that only in
the natural sciences, and certainly not in the affairs of human living,
can knowing occur and progress. But we do ask - and we likely try to
avoid the company of those who do not ask - sincerely, the Socratic
question: "What should I do?" Answers to the "What should I do?"
question, like questions about protons, may be hard to arrive at; but
the fact that knowledge makes "a bloody entrance"34 proves not that
knowledge is impossible, but that, if what is possible is to become
actual, something is required of those who would reach it. No ques-

30. Quoted in ARTHUR KOESTELLER, THE ACT OF CREATION: A STUDY OF THE
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES OF HUMOR, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, AND ART
124 (Danube ed., 1976).
31. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY xi (Seabury paperback ed.,
1979) (hereinafter LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 5. For a compendious treatment of these issues, see Patrick McKinley Bren
nan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227, 277-83 (2002).
34. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 20, at 186. In his work nearly two decades later,
philosopher Bernard Lonergan references knowledge's "bloody entrance" specifically in the
context of the movement from ordinary language to theory. LONERGAN, METHOD IN
THEOLOGY, supra note 31, at 85.
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tions, no answers; no answers, no knowing. No building on (and cor
recting) what has been handed down, no possibility of progress. There
are, to be sure, currents of thought that deny that there are answers to
the Socratic question. B ut here we do well to recall the courageous
honesty of that analytical philosopher of the last century, Elizabeth
Anscombe. In her j udgment, the person who would smartly assert ne
science as to, say, the comparative worth of a piece of straw and a
village of innocents, would show us all a "corrupt mind," a mind with
which she would decline to have commerce.35 Almost no one wants to
reveal a corrupt mind. "[O]ne may be willing to play the buffoon , but
one wants to do it intelligently."36 Who will be heard to say, at least for
long, that he knows nothing of an answer to the Socratic question? We
answer this question all the time, as did our forebears; White shows us
something of how it's done. And that it is done, makes all the differ
ence:

The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact,
and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but
simultaneously with it. The sceptic, then, is not involved in a conflict with
absolute necessity. He might not be; he might not be a knower. Contra
diction arises when he utilizes cognitional process to deny it.37
III. HUMANS ARE EQUAL?
One of the virtually unfailing contributions of White's work is
an exorcising of the Platonism of Forms that operates undetected in
so many of us so much of the time.38 In The Edge of Meaning the
exorcism is worked in every chapter; page by page we are delivered
from the grip of the delusion that we can (if we would) see, and do not
have to labor to discover, what is real, what is worthwhile. This liber
ating challenge is worked most pointedly at the heart of the book,
through a rich reading of Plato's Phaedrus. Space doesn't allow j ustice
to be done to that reading here, but White himself, as he turns from
Plato to Frost and Herbert, offers this apt encapsulation of it:

The point about Plato's doctrine of the Eternal Forms, in this dialogue at
least, is thus not to assert the truth of their existence, which can after all
never be known or observed while we live, but to define, by their ab
sence, what human life, as we actually know it, lacks.The myth is a way
of drawing attention to the fact that knowledge of the Forms is denied us.
We must live on conditions of radical uncertainty; and it is to show us
how this might be done without collapsing into incoherence or despair
that the dialogue exists ....(p. 189)
35. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958).
36. LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, supra note 23, at 224.
37. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 20, at 332.
38. On such Platonism in modern legal theory, see SMITH, supra note 29, at 241-50.
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It is a question of fact, of course, whether we have access to a tran
scending Form of, say, j ustice, and each of us must answer for himself.
My own j udgment, as I have implied, is that I have been denied all
such access; nor, as a matter in fact, do I know anyone else who will
admit to thinking differently of his own case (though easy talk about
"intuitions" of this or that should make the hearer nervous). Yet, from
the absence of Forms there does not follow necessarily a living in
"conditions of radical uncertainty." Again, it is a question of fact. How
uncertain in fact are the grounds of our choosing and deciding?
White does not exemplify "living on conditions of radical uncer
tainty," at least not when it comes to some very important matters.
One thing White seems to know is that we are, all of us, equals and
worthy of treatment as equals. Evidence this sentence: "The proper
object of human community is the recognition of the equal value of
each person as a center of worth and meaning

.

.

. . "39 And this one:

There is nothing that I would hold to more dearly in our past than the
language of the Declaration of Independence, "all men are created
equal.... " Yet upon what does this value of equality rest? Is it self
evident? Certainly not, and one may find oneself in deep trouble trying
to rest it upon independent philosophical foundations.40
Notwithstanding the troubles, White affirms the equality of humans as
a fact that should shape our conduct, and does so without evident
equivocation or modality. What, then, would be the foundations on
which White takes this firm stance? Is it the case that a linguistic lump,
written more than two hundred years ago, is White's last word on this
topic?
White has suggested that the equality asserted in the Declaration,
and put to work by Lincoln, may depend upon a Christian metaphysics
of creation (the Declaration does, after all, have us "created" equal).41
Responding to those who would purge our common language of what
cannot be sustained without religious supports, White continues:

To remit ourselves entirely to the language of twentieth-century political
philosophy would I think involve a great loss of power and significance in
our language of fundamental value. I at least would not want our legal
and political language to be one in which the Declaration of Independ
ence made no sense.42
Language "of fundamental value" that fails to make sense, is (perni
cious) nonsense - and White, as I have said, doesn't go for nonsense.
But given the truth is not so objective as to be able to get by without
the mind of the human subject, there is intellectual work for us to do

39. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at 269.
40. WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at 1 45-46.
41. Id. at 1 46-47.
42. Id. at 147.
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here, notwithstanding White's own confident (if precatory) assertions.
Does the Declaration's assertion of equality make sense to us; and if it
does, on what basis? Philosopher P. Christopher Smith grasps both
horns of the dilemma: "Ostensibly, of course, logic's monological
demonstration presents to silent onlookers the inferences to be drawn
necessarily from any individual's insights into necessary and certain
self-evident truths - see the starting point . . . . of Jefferson's apparent
demonstration, 'We hold these truths to be self-evident
fact, Smith continues,

. . . . ' "43 But in

any attempt to substitute logical demonstration for rhetorical conviction
only falsifies this circumstance [of assent] and opens the way for propa
gandistic manipulation in the guise of "objectivity." (Even Jefferson,
whose goal is to win consent to a revolutionary act, finds himself con
strained to disguise his rhetorical exhortation and defense as a demon
stration seeking only assent to a proposition).44
That White's embrace of the first substantive component of the
Declaration - the equality of humans - is neither propaganda nor
manipulation, emerges for me from what he culls from Mark Twain's
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. On White's reading, Huck
"comes to challenge race and slavery in his conduct, even while
affirming [them] in his language and his 'conscience,' " by adopting
the following method: "He learns to test everything by his own imme
diate experience" (p. 36). As White elaborates Huck's method: "The
irresolvable inconsistencies between his two worlds" - the world of
nature and the river, and the world of the city, Petersburg - "lead
him to develop the habit of turning to his own experience, confused
and untutored though it is, as the only possible standard of j udgment"
(p. 37). This method is the right one, according to White; which is not
to say that it is infallible:

This practice naturally generates a mixture of error, superstition, and ac
curate perception, and he, naturally enough, does not know which is
which. But to do this at all he must be resolutely, sometimes devastat
ingly, honest with himself, both in his perceptions and in his accounts of
them.. Although his marginality does not give him a firm place to stand,
.
then, it does teach him to focus on his own experience, however flawed it
may be, as a mode of thought and reflection. And while the conflicts be
tween his two worlds do not reach the issues of race and slavery, the
habit of mind and attention they stimulate will ultimately do so. (p.37)
Huck does not become a philosopher, thank God. B ut the Huck
Finn of White's sensitive reading does exemplify that part of the
human self, of interest to White, that asks questions, and in answering
them constitutes himself a person of a certain sort. White obscures the

43. P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT:
DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC 6-7 ( 1998).
44. Id.

at 7.
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point somewhat by suggesting that Huck properly treats his brute
experience as the "standard of j udgment." But as White shows time
and again, brute experience is a starting point, not a "standard of
judgment." It is by questioning experience, in the way White
describes, that Huck is able to come to a j udgment that he (and we?)
regard as correct. And answering honestly - instead of "answering"
with the language that might have been quick off the tongue, but not
true to experience (which is always particularized) - Huck's perform
ance exemplifies White's observation that, "When we are working at
our best we do not j ust use words with preexisting meanings, but
create relations among them that will give them meanings of a new
kind" (pp. 111-12).
White demonstrates this by making sense of an expression that had
always puzzled me upon earlier readings of Huck Finn. Huck declines
law's command to surrender Jim on the heels of a prompt from his
" 'conscience' " to turn in "this n igger, which I had as good as helped

to run away . . . . "45 Promptly reflecting on his radical reversal of
course, Huck - stuck between his j udgment that he had "done
wrong" and his contemporaneous j udgment that had he "done right"
he would have felt j ust as bad - concludes: "So I reckoned I wouldn't
bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever come
handiest at the time" (p. 34). "Handiest" had always rankled in my
mind as facile in a way Huck had j ust refused to be - and White
shows why a reading such as mine is wrong. The (superlative) adjec
tive "is given content by the kind of moral reflection and action i n
which Huck is engaging: it means . . . the course o f conduct that con
forms to one's deepest moral and emotional intuitions" (p. 111). A
dictionary-shopping Supreme Court, by contrast, would have Huck's
animadversion upon his great moment come to some version of the
following (if, that is, the Court elected to consult Random House Web
ster's Unabridged Dictionary in its Second Edition): a resolve to do
what is most "within easy reach; conveniently available; accessible . .
convenient or useful . . . skillful with the hands; deft; dexterous . . .
easily maneuvered . . . . " 46
.

IV. GETTING IT RIGHT
Of course, the Supreme Court does not read novels; but the
Justices of the Court do read a lot (not to mention write), and the
consequences of the Justices' reading skills affect how we all stand in
relation to one another. White has much to say about how the Justices
should read (and write), about, specifically, how being constituted as a

45. P. 34 (internal citation omitted); MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF
HUCKLEBERRY FINN 98 (1985).
46. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 867 (2d ed. 2001).
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court (or rather, this Court) should inform what one reads for. A
concomitant of White's sound insistence on law as (in part) constitu
tive conversation is the affirmation that we have (ineluctably but also
by intelligent design) our different roles in the conversation, positions
that themselves have to be claimed and argued for, this on the basis of
texts the authority of which itself needs j ustifying.47 Speaking of a law
yer who has hewed to the method White clarifies and commends, and
who then finds herself faced say with two lines of cases pointing in
opposite directions, White concedes, " [y]ou are in a sense free to
choose whichever way you want to go . . . . " Then, however, he adds
immediately: " [B]ut that hardly helps, for the question remains: How
should you exercise the freedom you have?" (p.

251).

This, the

Socratic question, won't go away, at least not for more than a moment
at a time. And its answer, White continues,

certainly ought not rest on whim or untutored reactions, but rather on a
process of thought and reflection, as you seek to organize the material on
both sides into a manageable whole, in light of what you take to be the
central values expressed in [the relevant text] and in the cases decided
under it.The end of the process will not be a moment of perfect clarifica
tion, but an action on your part, a decision, with its roots in the world be
yond words, ultimately a mystery even to you. (pp. 251-52)
What White here refers to as "a process of thought and reflection,"
White elsewhere elaborates in these terms: " [T]he law is nothing if it is
not a way of paying attention and respect to what is outside of our
selves: to texts made by others in the past, which we regard as authori
tative, and to texts made in the present by our fellow citizens, to which
we listen" (p. 91). White specifies the aim of that "way of paying atten
tion and respect," but not exhaustively.

The object of law is justice; but the law teaches us, over and over again,
that we do not have unmediated access to the pure idea of justice in the
heavens, which we can apply directly and with confidence, but rather live
in a world in which everything has to be thought about, argued out, and
reimagined afresh. (pp.250-51)

47. White writes:

In the law ...every speaker is particularly located, both rhetorically and socially. He or she
is a lawyer or a judge, a judge of a state or a federal court, a lawyer arguing to a jury or
making a motion to a judge, and in every instance is situated as well with reference to a set
of prior and arguably authoritative texts: constitutions, statutes, earlier cases, and the like.
This is the context in which "policy" questions are discussed in law, and these conversations
receive their proper shape from that context. The authority of the legal actor is never self
established, but always rests, at least in argument, upon prior texts, which provide the stan
dards that govern the authority they establish.This means, among other things, that the legal
speaker must always look outside himself for his source of authority; that his every action
rests upon a claimed interpretation of those sources of authority; and that these interpreta
tions, of necessity, are compositions to which he asks that authority be given.
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at 96.
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I suggested above that White's work combats the Platonism that
threatens to skew our thinking heavenward, and the above passage is
something of a case in point. B ut it strikes me as itself laden with a
trace of latent Platonism. Justice is reified, and then we are merely
cautioned only that "we do not have unmediated access to the pure
idea of j ustice in the heavens" (p. 250). Having been reminded that the
heavens are off limits, this reader hoped for an insistent reminder that
it is, then, to the earth and its inhabitants, in all their amplitude, that
we can and must look to settle how we should stand to one another.
Yes, in "the world beyond words," but in the world (p. 1). Even if God
grants revelation, He grants it to us here where we live; he does not, so
far as I know, invite any of us to Heaven for (mediated) fireside chats
and then send us back down here to do what we have been told to do.
And if God does reveal instructions for human living (in, say, Ten
Commandments given at Sinai), these. too, like the Rosetta Stone,
await their being read and interpreted. Even truth that purports to be
divine, is not so objective as to be able to get by without the mind of
the human subject. White knows this, but on occasion in his writing,
justice seems to assume a form to which it is not, I think, entitled.
I return to a larger-than-life example of this in the final Section,
but first I call attention to another element of the passage just quoted.
Initially, White tells us that we "live in a world in which everything has
to be thought about, argued out, and reimagined afresh" (p. 251). Is
there in this observation a whiff of the modern rationalist of whom
Michael Oakeshott says: " [H]e strives to live each day as if it were his
first."48 We know White better than that. White is a self-conscious
participant in an intergenerational conversation, both learning from
and adding to, possibly even correcting, what has been handed down.
By picking up where others left off, rather than striving to live every
day as if it were his first, the inquiring mind doesn't have to start from
scratch, though of course one may have occasion to correct what one
has inherited. Again Newton tumbles to mind. Trouble is, whereas in
the natural sciences we are ready to grant that what is inherited is not
dead weight but a helpful starting point, with regard to questions
about how to live, many among us are poised to deny tradition any
positive role whatever. We imagine that scientific method's success
owes nothing to its being a particular form and deployment of the
cognitive method by which our knowing occurs. We fail to live in
accord with the (apparent) fact that our learning comes to pass discur
sively (rather than spasmodically) - building up from experience to
j udgment by way of the interpretations we are able creatively and
correctly to give that experience. White's work shows on every page
how our thinking about our living, including in law, is shaped by the

48. MICHAEL 0AKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 1, 3
(1962).
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languages and learning we inherit, and that our learning and the value
of our living can grow by building on, and correcting where necessary,
what we have received.49
Having made this case for the (potential) value to us of our intel
lectual inheritance, it would do us well to recall that the person overly
concerned to conserve what he has received will petrify and thus cease
to be relevant. It is easy to talk the talk we have heard talked, easy
to apply without thinking about them the rules handed down on an
earlier occasion, for another case. But doing so is not only dull, but
also unsatisfying. White's genius is to see that our radically personal,
nondelegable desire for meaning is satisfied only by our making up
our own minds, each of us for himself. Our desire for meaning is satis
fied only by reaching our own j udgments. We can be mistaken in these
j udgments, but this only proves that we can be correct as well. White
makes this point as he describes how we reach the meanings of several
pictures by Rembrandt, but he could j ust as well have taken as his
example the meanings of Vermeer's paintings, Homer's
lover's smile:

Iliad,

or the

Sometimes of course we are misled or otherwise make a misjudgment,
but this fact merely confirms the power and accuracy of our judgment as
a general matter. Yet exactly how we read each other's appearance is a
mystery: no objective rules, say interpreting the shape of the skull or the
distance between the eyes or the fullness of lips, will work. This is a ca
pacity we have and use, but one that is not wholly accessible to the con
scious mind. (p.282-83)
White's work helps us bring this capacity to the reader's conscious
ness, and what it reveals is that we constitute ourselves, we constitute
our world by the j udgments we reach. As Professor Thomas Kohler
says, in a fine little essay that complements, from a more strictly philo
sophical angle, White's position:

[T]he act of judging represents a personal commitment and entails per
sonal responsibility. When we judge, we assert or deny something about
the character of reality, or the worth of a certain course of action. We
thereby literally commit ourselves to a certain understanding of the
world and its meaning.... We do not come to an understanding of real
ity or the good by "viewing" it, but by making correct judgments about it.
At the same time, we constitute ourselves through our judgments and de
termine through them the sort of people we become.5 0
White vindicates against unj ustified demands for "certainty," the
kind of knowing we do all the time that does not admit of the sort of

49. My stance on the place of tradition and self-correction in law is indebted to Mary
Ann Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance: The Struggle for Self-Appropriation in
Law, in 10 LONERGAN WORKSHOP 119 ( Fred Lawrence ed., 1994).
50. Thomas C. Kohler, The Integrity of Unrestricted Desire: Community, Values, and the
Problem of Personhood, in AUTONOMY AND ORDER: A COMMUNITARIAN ANTHOLOGY
57, 58 (2000).
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demonstration the scientist would be interested in. And while some
times White's opposition to the certainists leads to assertions that we
live and decide in conditions of radical uncertainty, White also calls
attention to the ways in which, amidst uncertainty that may seem
radical, we reach j udgments that are correct. (Sometimes correct
j udgments will be j udgments of probability, but a judgment of a prob
ability is not a mere meaningless guess.) At the beginning I quoted
White as saying that the search for meaning always requires "faith" on
the part of the searcher. The assertion is provocative, but what does it
come to? It is the fact of our knowing both meaning and value, not a
nonrational hope for such knowing, that gives us reason both to hope
and believe that our deep desire to know will again be satisfied. To the
common strain of thought that persists in identifying knowing with
seeing, all this will continue to seem spooky. The slogan has it that
seeing is believing. B ut seeing is only seeing; and knowing consists in
answering questions. Sometimes we answer our questions by relying
on the knowings of others we know or believe to be trustworthy; the
alternative, doubting everything one has not seen for oneself, is as silly
as it is impossible. While White

says

(in the passage I quoted at the

beginning) that we all have faith in our capacity for "seeing what is
really there" in the universe, what White shows is the method by
which we know even what we cannot see, the world of meaning and
value. Never do we see meaning or value, but, at least sometimes, each
of us knows them. To call such knowing 'faith' because it involves (as
known) what one cannot see, does not work a linguistic sin. But the
better course, I think, is to affirm forthrightly that the world we know
is not exhausted by the world we can see.
V.

FALL IN LOVE, lF YOU ARE ABLE

I have emphasized, because it is the emphasis of White's book, that
humans desire meaning and when they lack meaning they tend to be
come less than human. What this obscures, however, is that meaning is
not enough. Our deepest desire extends beyond meaning to value.51
Which mearis that, first , we want to know what things are really worth,
second, we want our lives to instantiate the truly worthy. A piece of
straw may mean the world to me, but if I prefer it to the lover's gaze,
to food on the table, or to a reliable system of distribution of com
modities of value to humans' living, then so much the worse for me
(and alas, perhaps for the neighbors as well). We ask questions about
what is; we ask also about what is valuable, what is worth doing, what
relationships or states of affairs are worth bringing into existence.

51. White catches this nicely in his suggestion that "the desire to understand, to make
sense, to imagine coherently includes, or better ripens into, a desire for what Thoreau would
call a sincere relation with another - for friendship, ultimately for love. " Pp. 69-70.
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Questions of the latter sort are versions of what I have referred to as
the Socratic question. "Our answers to these questions of worth make
up part of the moral reality in which we live. It is through them,
to paraphrase the rabbis, that we cooperate in the completion of
creation. "52
Value as what we desire, and valuing as something we do in
response to a nondelegable desire to realize or instantiate the valuable
- these, White too thinly thematizes. Value does not occur in his
index, and when value makes the occasional explicit appearance, its
significance is hard to gauge, as when White observes at the beginning
of his final chapter: "In this book I have worked through a series of
texts in which a mind can be seen as trying to imagine the world, and
the self within it, in such a way as to make possible coherent speech
and valuable action"(p. 257). And again:

[W]e are collectively not very clear about exactly what it is we point to in
[our many] uses of the word meaning. One way of putting it - which I
know can be only the slightest of sketches, and which it is the aim of the
rest of the book to complete - is to say that each of us constantly seeks
to imagine the world, and the self and others within it, in such a way as to
enable us to engage in coherent and intelligible speech, valuable and ef
fective action. We want, that is, a way of imagining life as a whole, on
which our own action and thought and speech, our own relations with
others, can sensibly and effectively be based.(p. xi)
We should agree with White that discovering ways of living that
are meaningful requires the creativity that begins iri imagination. B ut
we should observe at once that we are not satisfied by castles in
the sky, imagined ways of living that enthrone the worthless (while
suppressing the valuable). "When children play by building sand
castles, these castles are truly castles for them. If you trample them,
the children will cry with rage and indignation. But once their play is
at an end, what were castles are only sand."53 Adults play, but when
adults endue things with meaning and accord them value they will not
bear, we doubt their wisdom and, at the limit, their sanity. We may
and must use our imagination to discover how to realize and instanti
ate value, but we must recall at our peril, that real value is not
imagined. White knows much and shares much about what is truly
valuable. In The Edge of Meaning it is perhaps above all in his inter
pretation of Vermeer, to which I called attention at the beginning, that
he reveals his awareness that a worthwhile human life not only
includes meaning, but also instantiates value. But the whole book
breathes an apprehension of value, and this reader, at least, looked for
a more elaborated recognition that our basic human eros, about which
White reveals so much, is for the whole truth: the true that is,

52. Kohler, supra note 50, at 63.
53. Maritain, supra note 1, at 59-60.
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true that as valuable can become the proper aim of our choosing and
acting and living. We constitute ourselves not only by what we say, but
also by what we choose and do. So it is, for example, that we pity or
mock the younger Lord Brideshead when Evelyn Waugh reveals that
his Jesuitical character occupies himself most satisfiedly in collecting
matchboxes (and met his future wife through the connection of her
late husband, the consummate collector of the same little treasures).
"One's j udgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfilment
or to one's loss. "54
Justice, it has been said, is the institutional approximation of love,
and it is a saying that becomes the more adequate the more equity
emerges as justice's other part. But such j ustice - even the j udge do
ing equity's bidding, what the legislature would have done had it had
in mind the case sub j udice - professes nothing of love. White speaks
to us of justice, he shows us how we desire, seek, and sometimes
instantiate j ustice; but White, as I observed in beginning, also speaks
to us of love. And it is here more than anywhere else, I think, that
White lays bare his true thinking about what I have referred to as
'value' and how we can come to know it:

The lawyer lives on the edge of language, where meaning is made, and
just like the poet and philosopher he must work constantly with the in
adequacies of his inherited ways of talking, the defects of his own mind,
the fundamental uncertainties of the world, the incomplete knowability
of the experience of others; and he may well find his most secure ground
of confidence and belief to lie in the activity of law itself, which stimu
lates and works by a kind of love, less for another person than for the
possibility of justice itself.(p. 258)
Love for the possibility of j ustice itself, more than for the person
- this is hard to get the non�Platonic mind around.55 The word 'love'
is used (as Aristotle might say) "in many ways," and there is much in
what White writes that helps in sorting out and clarifying the several
Greek senses of the reality that, in English, we refer to as 'love . ' B ut
when White directs our attention to what he calls his own "love" for
the Herbert who doubts God's willingness to love such a one, I think I
get a sense of what White means by love, and it is something that
eluded the Greek theorists. What White bears toward Herbert is not
erotic love, nor even the love that is, simple but wonderful, friendship,
philia. It is the love called in the Greek of the New Testament agape.
This is reverence of the person, a reverence that would lead to service

54. LONERGAN, supra note 31, at 39.
55. Another example of the Platonism of Forms seems to creep into White's work:
[Vermeer] makes us desire perfection and security, at the same time teaching us that all that
we can value is perpetually subject to threat. All of this may remind us of Plato and the fa
mous myth: Vermeer stimulates in his viewer a kind of love, love for these images of women,
which becomes not a love for any person - there is no person there at all - but of beauty
itself, and of the vitality and volatility of human life.P. 287.
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because of the value of the person that has been known and conse
quently affirmed.
That this is the love White knows is at work when law succeeds
(by, among other aims, recognizing "the equal value of each person as
a center of worth and meaning"56) is reinforced in what White says of
the causes of Huck's transformation: '!The self [Huck] makes by
speaking and thinking [as he does], insisting upon the truth of his
experience, becomes, in the end, a self capable of giving and receiving
love" (p. 42). Huck comes to affirm Jim's equal value as a human
thanks to Jim's capacity "for love and truthfulness." Huck becomes
capable of loving, of affirming Jim's equal value, through "the active
and transforming presence of another person" (p. 44). While White
goes on to observe . that the obtaining social structures gave Jim and
Huck no opportunity to go on living together in the way they had
discovered they deeply stood and deeply wanted to · stand to each
other, withal it was the experience of person, in what we call .agape,
that worked the personal change and simultaneously brought an in
dictment of the social structure.57
This exemplifies what John Noonan said in encapsulating the the
sis of his study of the proper application of rules to the person in the
name of the law: "Only in the response of person to person can
Augustine's sublime fusion be achieved, in which j ustice is defined as
'love serving only the one loved.' "58 It is love for the person that
enables Huck to make a declaration, not of independence, but of
equality. What White occludes for me with the quoted suggestion that
the lawyer succeeds more through the love of the possibility of j ustice
itself than for the person, Noonan reveals and releases. It is love of the
person that moves us to serve as best we can - sometimes taking the
form of j ustice, sometimes taking the form of supererogation. Love
precedes or is a precondition of true j ustice, of seeing people as they
are and treating them as what they are, what they are worth.59
Each of the chapters of The Edge of Meaning is followed by para
graphs or pages that contain snippets of the author's moral autobiog
raphy. In them White shows us something of how he came to know the
world he shares with, and commends to, his readers. In the last of
these nine windows opened to us, White relates something concerning
a young girl with whom he, as a part of a team of five people working

56. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at 269.
57. On the relationship between agape and equality (or equal regard), see GENE
0UTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 9-23, 257-312 (1972).
58. NOONAN, supra note 13, at xii.
59. See TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, THE PRIORITY OF LOVE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 8-11, 68-69 (2003). On the foundational place of "natural love " in our
knowing things as they are and giving them what in justice they deserve, see HANS URS VON
B ALTHASAR, THEO-LOGIC 77-78 (Adrian J. Walker trans., 2000).
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to help children who were having trouble in school, met once a week
for a couple years. "Here is this child beside me, I thought," having
j ust heard that two of Elizabeth's relatives had been killed,

suffering what no child should suffer. She is a fragment of God's pres
ence on earth, as real and as important as any other, calling out for what
I cannot provide, what no one can provide.What can I give her? Not my
mind, or my professional expertise, or my intellectual life; only my pres
ence, for whatever it might be worth.
That and one other thing: it occurred to me that she might have trouble
understanding what reading is because she had never been read to. So in
our lessons I began reading to her from her book, then she would read,
then I would read again. It became something we did together.(p.288)
In this, White was, or so it seems to me, doing j ustice (or what exceeds
justice): acting not for j ustice's sake , but because he loved the person.
Much thinking about law, much application of law, leaves love out.
B ut once love's place in law has been recognized for what it should
be, it is hard to disagree with Noonan's claim that "the central
problem . . . of the legal enterprise is the relation of love to power. "60
The core of "the central problem," in turn, concerns whether we can,
whether we have reason to, love one another. Agape is not an idealiz
ing act: it looks to the other as he or she is.61 If we humans are j ust
natural processes, meat with brain function - are we loveable? Does
our being capable of loving one another depend on our being, as
White said of Elizabeth, "a fragment of God's presence on earth? "
That would make true faith a necessity. If w e affirm, with Huck Finn
and James Boyd White and others, the equal worth of humans, on
what basis can we do this? Nonsense should be avoided,62 but its
avoidance is by no means automatic: "Any proposition to us about
ourselves we are in a position utterly to deny - it being always
remembered that what the proposition is, if we grant the other is like
ourselves, remains always a live question and that words, the words of
the proposition, do not define themselves."63

60. NOONAN, supra note 13, at xii.
61. See GLENN TINDER, THE POLITICAL MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY:
INTERPRETATION 42-44 (1989).

AN

62. On the difficulties and importance of affirming the equality of humans, see JOHN E.
COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN
INSIGHT (1999), and Patrick McKinley Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J.L. &
RELIGION 99 (2002).
63. JOSEPH VINING, THE HUMANITY OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND SPIRIT AFTER THE
20TH CENJURY 168 (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 1 68, on file with author). Judge John
Noonan's polemic against Judge Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, 1 11 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998), concludes with a statement of the place of love in
law that deeply informs my own thinking. But Noonan's otherwise flawless analysis loses
strength by treating the issue of knowing the value of another human being as a matter of
"seeing":
The question who is to be included within humanity is crucial. You cannot convince an op-
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"Law can often look largely irrelevant to the self."64 Yes it can, and
White shows us why such an appearance of law is to be resisted. Law,
when it obtains, is (in part) meaning about value, which itself is the
fruit of the methodical asking and answering of questions. If what goes
forward in the name of law answers no questions of ours, it is no law
of ours. "What, then,'' asks White,

can be done by such creatures as we are, with such instruments as our
languages? It is upon their own performances that [both Frost and Her
bert] come in the end to rely: not upon creed, not upon denial, but upon
their capacity, the human capacity to make meaning in a universe that is
deeply uncertain.The self exists in a world it does not wholly understand,
cannot wholly understand, and for which no language is adequate . . . .
Something [like what these poets, and Plato, too, do], I believe is true of
the judge and lawyer as well. The law can be seen as a collective enter
prise the aim of which is to work out actual possibilities for thought
about justice in the difficult conditions in which we find ourselves. (p.

251)
Any j ustifying of law quickly moves, if it is to satisfy the inquiring
mind, from law-as-rules to legal method, establishing the terms of the
interdependence of law and the method that makes it what it is. And
legal method, for its part, if it can command obedience (rather than,
say, simple compliance), issues from the method that is human intelli
gence: experiencing, and then by questioning that experience reaching
meaning and value first in our j udgments, then in our living. As Joseph
Vining says, "The question what the law 'is' is not so very different
from the question what we ' are,' "65 and again in The Edge of Meaning,
James Boyd White irradiates for our benefit something of who we are,
and how through literature and poetry, and even law, we can become
who we should wish to be. There is a method to it, and falling in love,
if you can, helps.

ponent of the humanity of another by argument - on that fundamental point Posner is
right.But you can ask another human being to look harder, to ''see." Posner denies that you
can, suggesting that mere sight will change nothing if your intuitions are in disagreement.
Seeing, however, is more than a second glance. It is taking into account. intellectually, affec
tively, and physically, all that there is in another member of our species.
John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 1768, 1774 (1998).
64. KEVIN M.CROTTY, LAW'S INTERIOR 90 (2001).
65. VINING, supra note 16, at 128.

